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"The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but
whether it works....
-President Barack H. Obama'
INTRODUCTION
Justice is blind, not free. Litigation is expensive. Yet while significant scholarly
attention has been devoted to the private cost of litigation, largely unaddressed is the
cost of the civil court system itself--or who should bear it.2 Judges and court staff do
* Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School; A.B., Stanford University. This Article is an outgrowth of concepts in incentive theory,
distributive fairness, and choice making that I originally explored in ERISA, Agency Costs, and
the Future of Health Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297 (2008), and in
Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise, 2009 Wis. L.
REV. 657. l owe special thanks to Professor Shaun P. Martin at the University of San Diego Law
School and to my colleagues at OCU Law for their helpful criticism of earlier drafts. I would
also like to generally thank Professors Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Julie Forrester, and John Lowe of
Southern Methodist University Law School, former Texas State Supreme Court Justice Deborah
Hankinson, Professor Peter K. Stris of Whittier Law School, and William T. Hankinson, for
their encouragement.
1. President Barack H. Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press office/PresidentBarackObamas InauguralAddress.
2. In 1929, Professor Arthur Goodhart declared that "virtually no mention [of cost
shifting] has been made by American writers" and set forth his own seminal thoughts on the
subject (although, using English nomenclature, Professor Goodhart called "costs" what we
today call attorney's fees). See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 849 (1929).
Profound treatment of the private costs of litigation, and who should bear them, followed. See,
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not work for free, and courthouses do not build and maintain themselves; those costs
are almost entirely borne by the taxpayer as a pure judicial subsidy. This Article asks:
is that right? Or is there a more desirable way to apportion court usage costs between
the state and litigants?
In Part I, I describe our current system as one offering nearly 100% subsidized
"court insurance" for all litigants and consider why that is the case. We subsidize court
use because there are, in theory, considerable "social positives" (i.e., benefits not
internalized by the litigants) associated with public adjudication.3 I construct an
evaluative framework with which to assess the wisdom ofthe status quo and determine
whether the theoretical social positives attributable to subsidized court use attach with
equal force to all court use by all players in all cases. Were that assumption not true, a
differentiated subsidy should be considered, namely, a subsidy that distinguishes
between different court users and uses in a way sensitive to the social positives at issue.
In Part II, I examine the social positives held to warrant public adjudication in the
first instance. These social positives can be grouped into two conceptually useful
categories: "consequentialist" and "consonant" rationales. Roughly, the former is akin
to "cost-benefit"analysis; the latter to "fundamental value" analysis- namely, "X" is
fundamentally fair, just, or desirable and its absence is fundamentally unfair, unjust, or
undesirable. I examine justifications in each category as a necessary prerequisite to
examining whether and how a differentiated subsidy could compromise either category
of social positives.
In Part III, I investigate the costing and measuring side of the current subsidy. The
appropriate consumption and cost unit of the subsidy is time, that is, cost incurred per
time unit consumed by the litigants in a given case. A "cost-minute" approach would
precisely and transparently reflect the contours and beneficiaries of the subsidy, and it
would be the most sensible metric for measuring the cost obligation of nonsubsidized
litigants in a differentiated-subsidy world.4
In Part IV, I imagine a possible reconstruction of the subsidy resulting from an
application of the analytical framework developed herein. Specifically, each litigant
would bear responsibility for one half of court usage costs, collectible at the conclusion
of the case, with three provisos. First, a significant proportion of litigants would
receive an "access" subsidy designed to address risk-aversion and liquidity problems
e.g., Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost ofLitigation?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75
(1963); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 792 (1966); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from
Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1597 (1974); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee
Shifting: A Critical Overview, 31 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982); I.P.L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit,
Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 539 (1983); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 141 (1998). Yet little attention has been devoted to determining-or even
assessing how to determine-4he ideal public and private split of litigation costs, aside from the
occasional proposal to significantly increase filing fees. See, e.g., FIRST REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETrs 63-64 (1925); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISS
AND REFORM 132-37 (1985).
3. 1 use the term "social positives"--rather than either "positive externalities" or "public
goods"-deliberately. See infra note 15.
4. Minute-based estimates of time expended, including both costed and noncosted
minutes, have been used in a handful of academic and administrative studies of limited scope
and have proven to have powerful descriptive value. See infra Part III.A.
1528 [Vol. 85:1527
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that might thwart access in a user-pays system. Second, appeals would be subsidized.
Third, a retributive tax-where losing litigants outside the first two exemptions pay to
the state the winner's half of court usage costs, in addition to their own-would be
implemented. Although more empirical research is needed, plausible assumptions
about the current civil litigation system suggest this model could offer considerable
savings5 compared to the current monolithic subsidy, without-in theory-materially
undermining the social positives generated by public adjudication.6
I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE SUBSIDY
Few consciously view the nation's civil court system as a subsidy. Yet it is, and the
first step in a disciplined inquiry is to make explicit the baseline rationale for having
any judicial subsidy-namely, that the subsidized adjudication must somehow serve
social interests beyond the interests of the litigants at bar. I then develop an analytical
framework with which to assess the merits of the current subsidy, as compared to
potential alternatives.
A. Subsidized Insurance and Social Positives
To the dismay of some and approval of others, America lacks national health
insurance. But it offers a very different kind of social insurance, one rarely discussed as
such: "court insurance." Whereas doctors are highly trained professionals expert in
medicine, judges are highly trained professionals expert in the law, and neither work
for free. Excepting the needy and the elderly, private parties must pay for the doctor's
time. Yet, no "legal patient" need pay for the court's time--or the ancillary costs that
go with "seeing a judge," that is, the cost of courtroom personnel or the cost of
operating and maintaining the courthouse. The only requirement is a modest co-pay,
namely, the filing fee. The state picks up the rest-no matter the characteristics of the
litigant, the nature of the dispute, or the length of the case.7
5. Reducing any subsidy obviously increases government revenue, which may be attractive
to states constitutionally obligated to balance their budgets; depending on one's macroeconomic
loyalties, however, efforts to balance budgets could have very undesirable economic
consequences in the current economy. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Fifty Herbert Hoovers,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at A25 (explaining that because of balanced budget rules many of
the fifty states will "slash[] spending in a time of recession, often at the expense both of their
most vulnerable constituents and of the nation's economic future"). Certainly, challenging
economic times make budget discussions more searching. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Shortfalls
Prompt Look at Unorthodox Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at A13 (noting that states are
now exploring the imposition of previously unconsidered taxes to raise revenue, such as taxes
on pornography and marijuana). However, I wish to stress that my evaluative framework and
reform speculations are in no way motivated by our economic crisis; the reconceptualization of
the subsidy offered here would be urged with equal force in times of plenty.
6. I do not here consider constitutional concerns arising from either the United States
Constitution or the constitutions of the individual states. My focus here is to develop a robust
theoretical scheme for assessing what an ideal subsidy should look like, absent particular
constitutional or political constraints.
7. Other modest fees may attach, such as a jury-impaneling fee. See, e.g., COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-71-144 (West Supp. 2009) ($190 fee); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 103
15292010]
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Why is this so? After all, insurance has well-known distortional effects on the
conduct of the insured, commonly called moral hazard.8 Specifically, insured players
are less likely to engage in the optimal level of precaution regarding the indemnified
risk (and more likely to engage in overconsumption of the insured service) than are
parties who bear the risk and cost themselves. 9 Insured players whose future premiums
are unaffected by their present conduct-either because they are one-time players,
because premium adjustment for past conduct is limited by regulation, or because
another party has future premium responsibility-are in turn more susceptible to moral
hazard than are insured players for whom present conduct can affect the level of future
premiums or the availability of future insurance. 10 The current legal system-with the
premiums and indemnity fully subsidized by the state, and with no "experience
rating"" adjustment in any case-is highly likely to result in the overconsumption of
judicial resources.' 2
Why do we tolerate such apparent "overconsumption"? The answer: because it is
actually "overconsumption" only to the extent there are insufficient positive
externalities arising from court use. Making something available at less than market
price, which is functionally what happens for services covered by subsidized insurance,
will result in overuse of that service only to that extent that countervailing positive
externalities-benefits not internalized by the users-are absent. When positive
(LexisNexis 2000) ($50 fee); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.604 (Vernon 2005) ($30 fee).
8. The writing on moral hazard is vast. Two classic pieces (addressing insurance in the
health care context) are Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. EcON. REv. 941 (1963), and Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard:
Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968). See also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996) (providing a thorough and fascinating discussion of moral
hazard with reference to and analysis of moral hazard writings of Arrow, Pauly, Richard
Epstein, and others).
9. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of
Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 299
(2007) (discussing examples of overconsumption of insured services and suboptimal efforts to
prevent loss).
10. Other factors, of course, can limit moral hazard (particularly when the risk involves
costs not entirely compensable by money, such as serious personal injury or death). See, e.g.,
Baker, supra note 8, at 278-79. For example, "court overuse" is constrained, obviously, by legal
fees.
11. Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA.
L. REv. 403,414 (1985) ("Experience rating ... uses the loss experience of the insured during
one period to help set the premiums charged in the following period.").
12. That is, ifwe assume all players are risk neutral (which they are not) and that there are
no externalities associated with court use (which there are), subsidization results in "court
overuse" because players will not be bearing the full cost of suit. Put simply, if players litigate
when expected gains exceed expected costs, artificially reducing costs with a subsidy will result
in some amount of socially undesirable litigation that causes a net decrease in total overall
welfare-that is, some amount of "court overuse." See Patrick E. Longan, The Case for Jury
Fees in Federal Civil Litigation, 74 OR. L. REv. 909, 912 (1995) (urging the payment ofjury
fees because "[t]hose who use a government service should pay its true costs or that service will
be overused"); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the
Social Motive To Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577-78 (1997) (explaining that
excessive litigation may occur because a litigant's legal costs do not include costs of his
adversary or the state).
[Vol. 85:15271530
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externalities are involved, there is an inadequate market incentive for individual actors
to engage in the socially optimal level of the positive-externality-generating activity
(here, court use). 3 To properly incentivize those actors, a government can effectively
lower the "price" of the activity by deploying a subsidy such that an optimal (or closer
to optimal) level of the activity occurs.' 4
Necessarily, then, the current system is premised on the notion that some level of
positive externality (in the broadest possible meaning of the term)' 5 is generated by
litigation. Court use, in short, is presumed to generate some greater social good-some
"social positive"--beyond the mere benefit it confers on litigants by resolving their
present dispute. What, then, are the "social positives" allegedly gained, and the costs
incurred, by subsidizing court use?16 The framework for answering that question is
discussed below.17
B. An Evaluative Framework
Consider the hypothetical of the imaginary "widget bar." The widget bar is the
ultimate candy bar: sold at cost for only $2.50, one widget bar satisfies a person's
nutritional needs for the day. But not only that-the widget bar, being green, also
magically improves the environment as it is eaten, to the tune of $2.00 in reduced
pollution.18
13. Consideration of externalities occurs in a broad range of legal fields. See, e.g., Jeffrey L.
Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and Application, 13 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 8-10 (2005) (intellectual property law); Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets
Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 977, 986-93 (1996) (tort liability rules); Russell S.
Jutlah, Economic Theory and the Environment, 12 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2001)
(environmental economics and regulation); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law,
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 772-75 (1995) (corporate law).
14. See generally JOHN B. TAYLOR, EcoNoMics 421-24 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing
subsidizing positive externalities and taxing negative externalities).
15. "Externality" is itself a pregnant term; the more narrowly it is defined, the less reason a
subsidy is warranted and the more likely a given level of use is "overuse." For example, under
some modes of analysis, "unfairness" would not be considered a negative externality. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIEs L. 309, 314 (2008) (rejecting "soft externalities"); cf Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462,
540 (1998) (noting that the definition of externality is unclear and can vary in breadth). To
narrowly define externality unfairly minimizes the range of arguments to be made in favor of the
status quo I criticize, and intellectual fairness requires not defining opposing arguments out of
the debate. For this Article's purposes, I use the term "externality" in the most expansive
possible sense-namely any arguable societal benefit that falls on nonlitigants or society at large
as a result of court use-so as to more thoroughly consider the arguments in favor of the status
quo. The term I generally use for the foregoing is a "social positive." For similar reasons, I do
not use the term "public good" (although, of course, "positive externality" and "public good"
themselves are distinguishable concepts).
16. See supra note 15.
17. See infra Parts I.B. & II.
18. Both widgets and pollution are favorite subjects of economists and legal scholars.
Pollution makes sense, as it is the paradigmatic real world example of a negative externality
(although here I am using an incidental pollution reducer as the generator of a positive
2010]
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Because the widget bar reduces pollution, it makes sense to subsidize widget bar
consumption by all eaters. Of course, because the widget bar is also capable of
preventing starvation, subsidizing widget-bar consumption for the needy (i.e., those
who would otherwise be unable to afford the widget bar) makes humanitarian sense,
even if there were no pollution reduction component to the bar's consumption. Modem
democratic societies do not let their citizens starve.'
9
Thus, we have different grounds for the widget-bar subsidy. In one case, subsidizing
a certain type of consumption activity leads to the desirable social outcome of reduced
pollution; in the other case, subsidizing a certain type of consumingplayer leads to the
socially desirable outcome of no starvation. Through that analytical lens, we see that to
the extent we can eliminate the subsidy when neither the targeted activity nor the target
player is involved, society would be better off. For example, if the widget bar lost its
pollution reduction abilities when used as an ingredient in mass-produced ice cream,
ice cream manufacturers purchasing widget bars should not enjoy the subsidy.
The widget-bar subsidy example seems silly, and it is. But it crystallizes the
contours of our inquiry into the judicial subsidy in a fertile way. To wit, the judicial
subsidy as currently costed and conceived is totally undifferentiated; all civil court use
by all players in all manner of cases is fully paid for by the state. That the net social
positive for every type of court use is even theoretically equivalent in magnitude or
kind seems doubtful. Consider: are the social positives associated with subsidizing a
status conference (one type of court activity) the same as subsidizing a Supreme Court
decision (another type of court activity)? Are the social positives associated with
subsidizing contract disputes between public corporations (one type of litigant) the
same as those associated with subsidizing a tort dispute involving a poor, elderly
plaintiff (another type of litigant)?20 Perhaps. But perhaps not.
A rational analysis of the subsidy---even to conclude that all parts of all cases by all
litigants do in fact warrant subsidization-requires a multistep process. First, one must
identify the various social positives attributable to public adjudication generally.
Second, one must conceptually disaggregate the subsidy, to determine (i) which types
of players and (ii) which types of court activities are, if subsidized, likely to lead to
some or all of the social positives previously identified. Activities or players that
generate little or no social positives should, in theory, not be subsidized. 21 The answers
externality). See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & JAMES E. HICKEY, JR. WITH SHEILA S. HOLLIS, ENERGY LAW
AND POLICY 36-37 (1989) (noting that pollution is a traditional example of a harmful
externality). The fascination with widgets is a mystery whose resolution, as they say, is beyond
the scope of this Article.
19. See, e.g., HAROLD L. WILENSKY, THE WELFARE STATE AND EQUALrrY 15-16 (1975)
(explaining that developed countries have safety nets to prevent abject misery); Edward B.
Foley, Interpretation and Philosophy: Dworkin's Constitution, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 171
(1997) ("[N]o constitution worth defending would permit citizens to starve to death ... ").
20. Cf Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1296 (2005) (arguing that the public stake in
product liability disputes is likely different than in business-to-business contract disputes).
21. In an admittedly very different setting-analyzing the relationship between morals and
police power-Professor Richard Epstein cautioned against the error of "assum[ing] that the
simple mention of a negative externality is sufficient to overwhelm.., very large economic
disruptions." Richard A. Epstein, Externalities Everywhere?: Morals and the Police Power, 21
HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 61,66 (1997) (emphasis in original). Here, I seek to avoid making an
[Vol. 85:15271532
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to those two inquiries will drive the development of a feasible reform agenda. And so
as to not divorce totally the theoretical analysis from reality (as tempting as that may
be), we must also consider a practical question: if the subsidy were to be eliminated for
some activities or players, how should the state determine what nonsubsidized players
owe? Under the current system, the cost value of the subsidy received by any particular
player cannot be accurately calculated. That should change, simply for reasons of
transparency, but also because it is a prerequisite to charging a nonsubsidized player an
amount corresponding to the public resources consumed.22
II. JUSTIFYING THE SUBSIDY
That the state provides adjudicative services does not mean those services should be
free (consider, for example, public transportation). However, if public judging is
superior to private resolution of disputes (insofar as public judging has greater social
benefits associated with it), then some level of subsidy for use of the former is
warranted. The necessary preliminary inquiry, then, is: what social positives flow from
public judging, when compared to private dispute resolution?
In my view, the relevant social positives fall into two categories: (1) "consonant"
positives and (2) "consequentialist" positives. The latter encompasses at its core
reasoning premised upon reasonably concrete "cost-benefit" type analysis, that is,
where the aim is to ascertain the readily measurable desirable ("benefit") and
undesirable ("cost") consequences of different world models, and compare the two. In
contrast, "consonant" positives are those that are essentially nonconsequentialist,
namely, arguments that rely upon a priori or fundamental perceptions of what is just,
fair, or otherwise desirable to conclude that public judging is "consonant" with these
first principles.23 (A bit of explanatory semantics: the asserted social positives of public
adjudication are simultaneously rationales for its provision, so I use "positive(s)" and
"rationale(s)" interchangeably as context and grammar require.)
A. "Consonant" Positives
I begin with the consonant rationales, because they reflect, in my estimation, the
most deep-seated attachment to the structure of the current system of public judging.
error in the other direction, by methodically not assuming that the mere mention of a social
positive justifies an undifferentiated subsidy.
22. The cost value of the services consumed is not the only possible way to charge the
player. For example, alternatives include a flat fee that represents the average subsidy per case,
or a fee based on the amount of money in dispute. But I leave consideration of those
possibilities (both their pluses and minuses) for another day. For ease of discussion, I use the
cost-recovery model to imagine the appropriate usage fee.
23. Although consonant rationales can often be supported by consequentialist analysis, they
acquire adherents not because of the strength of the proof that they are desirable in a cost-benefit
sense, but for nonconsequentalist reasons. But certainly, the rationales offered in the literature
can blur across my categories here, and the reader should not labor under the impression that I
contend the category boundaries are lapidary. Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26 (rev.
ed. 1999) ("All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging
rightness."). Some level of fuzziness is not a problem, because the aim here is not to supply an
unimpeachable or flawless categorization, but rather to use the categorization as a heuristic to
assess the appeal of proposed changes to the current subsidy.
2010] 1533
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As mentioned, consonant rationales are nonconsequentialist justifications for public
adjudication that rest upon the notion that public adjudication is "consonant" with a
core intuition about how things are or should be a priori.24 Consonant rationales
largely arise from three loci: that public judging is consonant with (1) fundamental
presumptions about the basic structure of any fair/just/moral society; (2) the healthy
operation of a pluralistic, democratic society such as ours; or (3) humans' neural
wiring. The first two are so familiar as to require only brief recitation.
Perhaps the most popular justification for public judging rests upon core
philosophical notions of what autonomous individuals expect from any fair society,
namely, that the government will make accessible some impartial and reliable
mechanism to protect their rights. In one familiar version of the argument, the
expectation is Lockean: why would an individual enter into the social contract absent
guarantees that he or she would have a forum in which to protect his or her rights and
seek redress for violations thereof?.25 Another version is Rawlsian: if, beyond a veil of
ignorance, one did not know one's place in society, surely one would choose a society
in which access to an impartial tribunal was available to all. Whatever the
philosophical mechanism employed (e.g., social contract, veil of ignorance, etc.), the
point is the same: that foundational principles require the state to provide all citizens
with legal means to protect their rights.
A second consonant justification is that public adjudication is part and parcel of the
healthy operation of pluralistic, constitutional democracies, such as those of the West.
26
Formal and public expression of the law encourages and promotes civic engagement,
leading to a richer public life that benefits all citizens.27 Permitting all citizens to
participate in the expression of values that occurs in public legal proceedings enhances
the dignity of the individual and strengthens the communal bounds of the body
politic.2 8 As Professor Owen M. Fiss famously put it, public adjudication in a
24. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977) (stating that a
principle is a "standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of
justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality").
25. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690); see also Albert Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The
Shortage ofAdjudicative Services and the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARV. L. REv. 1808, 1810 (1986) (describing the justification for public adjudication as
partially Lockean and explaining that the vindication of rights is "an essential part of the sensed
social compact").
26. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The
Right to Protect One's Rights, Part H, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527, 533 n.20 (reasoning that the
presence of the Constitution almost certainly implies a recognition of intrinsic rights, including
a right to litigate, for "noninstrumentalist" reasons); Morris B. Abram, Access to the Judicial
Process, 6 GA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1972) (arguing that lack of access to courts is functionally
similar to voter disenfranchisement).
27. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 582 (1997) (noting that public
adjudication "is the linchpin of a democratic scheme, reinforcing a multitude of democratic
ideals").
28. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2626 (1995) (public expression of values constitutes Hegelian "objective spirit" of
1534 [Vol. 85:1527
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constitutional democracy can often explain and identify the "values that define a
society and give it its identity and inner coherence.
' 29
A different type of consonant rationale can be extracted from research in behavioral
psychology conducted over the past thirty years. Humans, it seems, are hardwired with
a sense of "fairness." In a famous experiment (called the Ultimatum Game, and
repeated many times in different settings), a modest financial pot (e.g., $10) is to be
divided between two subjects. 30 One subject is given the right to make an offer on how
to divide it up; the other subject is given the right to accept or reject the offer.31
Because there is no repeat play, it makes rational sense for the first subject to make a
final offer of $0.01 to the second subject. That would make the first player better offby
$9.99 and the second player better off by $0.01-which is better for both players than
the alternative of the second player rejecting the deal. With no possibility of repeat
play, there is nothing to be gained by rejecting this deal and then treating the offeror
accordingly in the future. Yet rejection rates increase the further away the offeror gets
from a 50/50 split.32 One conclusion (although not a necessary one) is that humans are
hardwired to reject treatment perceived as "unfair., 33 1 do not pick sides in the debate;
community); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court andLitigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights, Part 1, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1175 (dignity values); Reuben, supra note
27, at 582.
29. Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations ofAdjudication, 6 LAw & HuM.
BEHAV. 121, 128 (1982) (discussing constitutional decisions); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against Settlement] (explaining
that the courts have a duty not only to resolve disputes, but also to "explicate and give force to
the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret
those values and to bring reality into accord with them"); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the
Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 961,968 (1992) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's function in part is to "recall values, commitments, or ideals which people have
somehow neglected, and to cause people to honor these values in their actions").
30. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1489-97 (1998) (discussing the
ultimatum game and the "fairness" behaviors of test subjects).
31. Id. at 1489-90.
32. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert
Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith
Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe, John Q. Patton &
David Tracer, "Economic Man " in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15
Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEtrAV. & BRAIN Sd. 795, 798 (2005) (explaining that, in experiments
performed with student populations, the most common offer was 50% and offers below 20%
were rejected half the time).
33. In studies of neural activity during the ultimatum game, brain areas believed to be
correlated with negative emotional states showed greater activity for unfair (i.e., not 50/50)
offers. See generally Alan G. Sanfey, James K. Rilling, Jessica A. Aronson, Leigh E. Nystrom &
Jonathan D. Cohen, The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game,
300 SCIENCE 1755 (2003). See also Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 441-42 (2005) (noting that ultimatum game
research "suggests that an intrinsic sense of fairness, albeit quantitatively tuned by cultural
norms, is part of our evolutionary heritage"); Kent Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An
Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes
on Implications for Corporate Governance), 71 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 983, 990 (2003)
(explaining that ultimatum-game bargaining experiments "have been used as evidence of the
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I merely suggest that some may quite credibly conclude that, in some meaningful way,
"fairness" is ingrained (and/or readily imprinted via culturalization) in human
perceptions. Observers whodraw that conclusion may therefore believe that to have a
system widely perceived as unfair (e.g., if the courthouse doors were closed to those
less fortunate) would result in widespread cognitive discord and be per se
undesirable.
34
B. "Consequentialist" Positives
Rule making. The most obvious social positive associated with public adjudication
is rule making, namely, rule creation, dissemination, and enforcement.35 That is,
litigation does not merely resolve the dispute between the parties; it results in state-
enforced damage and liability rules that govern future conduct. 36 There are three
important ways in which public judging-through rule making-can confer benefits on
society at large: (1) by creating and enforcing binding rules; (2) by creating widely-
knowable and applied rules; and (3) by creating better rules.
First, public adjudication creates and enforces rules that bind other players who are
subject (voluntarily or involuntarily) to the power of the state. Purely private
adjudications, to the extent that they result in rules at all, lack state-backed binding
power on other players (although violating non-state rules can and does have
reputational consequences, which can be significant). Accordingly, public rules have a
importance of fairness considerations in legal fields such as contracts, negotiations, property,
products liability, corporate bankruptcy, and corporate governance").
34. This could easily be categorized as a consequentialist rationale, insofar as the primary
objective is to avoid the consequence of widespread cognitive discord and unhappiness among
societal members. But I have left it in the consonant rationales because the argument orbits
around a perceived fundamental quality of human beings.
35. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why
Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 227 (1999)
(describing court opinions as public goods); Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the
Long Range Plan, 46 Am. U. L. REV. 625,662 (1997) (arguing that precedent has public value
and thus litigation deserves some level of subsidization); Edward Brunet, Measuring the Costs
of Civil Justice, 83 MICH. L. REV. 916, 933 (1985) (reviewing JAMES S. KAKALIK & ABBY
EIsENsHTAT ROBYN, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
COURT EXPENDITUREs FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES (1982)) (explaining that society subsidizes
civil litigation because of the "immense social value" of case law).
36. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). Landes and Posner conclude, among other things, that
adjudication serves two roles-dispute resolution and rule formation (precedent)-and that
private markets are likely to inadequately compensate judges and litigants for the latter. Id. at
241-42. Accordingly, "[t]he precedent-creating function of adjudication... may invite public
intervention in the judicial-services market." Id. at 242. Judge Posner nonetheless later
concluded, in 1985, that the federal courts were overloaded, and he proposed several means to
decrease federal filings, including increasing jurisdictional requirements and monolithically
increasing filing fees (to some unspecified level) for all litigants except indigents, to drive
disputants into state court. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 130-36. But see Martin D. Beier,
Comment, Economics Awry: Using Access Fees for Caseload Diversion, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1175, 1175-76 (1990) (criticizing increased filing fees as a method to divert cases into state
courts).
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greater deterrent effect.37 When faced with state rules governing conduct and loss
allocation, rational actors face a steeper price for rule breaking. Such is a net benefit
because it prevents some additional quantum of costly injuries and disputes from ever
occurring;38 that saves society injury costs suffered by the victim and litigation costs
borne by the disputants and the state.
Second, public adjudication, by way of written and openly available decisions,
creates widely knowable and routinely applied rules of conduct and loss-allocation. 
39
Such obviously enhances the deterrent effect of a binding rule in the first instance (by
increasing the chance that a given player will know of the binding rule and avoid the
harm-causing conduct). Thus, one consequentialist justification for requiring a public
record of the decision and its reasoning (e.g., a written opinion) is so that a rule (or a
new application of a rule) can effectively propagate throughout society and create the
maximum deterrence benefit. Star chambers are not only dangerously unfair to
litigants, they also starve adjudication of a critical deterrence function associated with
public decisions. Of course, not all public decisions with equal information penetration
have the same deterrence value; deterrence benefits are strongest when the
adjudications in question concern new liability or damage rules, or are applications of
existing rules to factual situations whose treatment was previously unclear. In those
cases the mass of affected conduct is larger.
Known and applied rules resulting from public judging have the additional salutary
effect of serving as guidance for private actors attempting to cheaply resolve recent,
nascent, or potential disputes. By dint of private ordering in the "shadow of the law,"
disputes that might otherwise consume significant resources can be resolved more
quickly through private remediation in whole or in part.40 Public decisions do more
than deter wrongful conduct in the first instance; they permit private actors negotiating
over already-occurred or yet-to-occur conduct with uncertain liability or damages
37. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 25, at 1814 ("[R]ules can be efficient only when they
are enforced."); Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power ofAdjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1043, 1114 ("[A] private market will supply an optimal amount of dispute resolution, but
not an optimal amount of dispute avoidance.").
38. Importantly, the deterrent effect on behavior is not entirely caused by fear of explicit
sanction; public expression of the law can have positive consequential effects through the
influence such expression has on the changing or strengthening of norms. See Marc Galanter &
Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ": Judicial Promotion andRegulation of Settlements, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1339, 1382 (1994) (noting that beyond fear of sanctions, the "law may change behavior
by influencing estimations of the correctness or feasibility of various sorts of behavior"). See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996)
(arguing that the law influences social norms).
39. Cf MARLNA VALVERDE, LAW'S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE 6 (2003) (taking
the position that "legal facts and legal judgments are only meaningful and effective within a
network, one that connects legal decisions and statutes" and that also includes a real-world
infrastructure).
40. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,950 (1979) (explaining that a key aim of divorce
law is to guide private ordering); see also McAdams, supra note 37, at 1100 (offering a new
theory of "adjudicative expression" which holds that in some circumstances "there will be some
compliance with adjudication even without the threat of sanctions or legitimacy").
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consequences to mutually allocate responsibility and risk based on the existing public
rules.
41
Third, public adjudication can improve rule quality; that is, it can create new rules
that result in greater total social benefit (however it is measured) than older (or absent)
judicial rules or rules created (or not created) through legislative means.42 Rule-making
duties and powers are shared between the legislature and the judiciary (although the
ideal division of that authority is hotly and endlessly debated43). Thus, intentionally or
not, public judging can result in the creation or modification of legal rules that will
increase overall social welfare.44 This is not limited to constitutional decisions;
common law rule formation or statutory interpretation can serve the same function.
45
There are many reasons why a legislative body may not pass rules with a net positive
societal effect-political paralysis, interest group capture, or a conscious decision to
leave certain rule-making prerogatives to judges. That in every case but constitutional
41. Cf Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 40. Obviously private ordering in the shadow of
unclear rules deprives society of the externality associated with litigating to conclusion and
getting a clearer rule. But private ordering is presumably more likely the more clear and
applicable a given rule is; that is, private ordering is more likely when the externality from
adjudicative resolution is likely to be smaller. That is not always the case, however, and several
scholars have complained of the public loss associated with private settlement of disputes, most
notably Professor Fiss. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 29, at 1085 (decrying
overenthusiastic embrace of settlement and alternate dispute resolution); see also Luban, supra
note 28, at 2622 (urging caution in embracing settlement as resolution for disputes in part
because settlements, like private adjudications, produce no binding precedents); cf Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 426 n. 195 (1982) ("[T]o the extent that civil
lawsuits enforce public norms, settlement of some claims may be more 'expensive' for the
public").
42. This is different than a deterrent effect. The deterrent effect is the net benefit gained
from actors more often following a desirable rule (compared to less rule compliance); the social
change effect is the net benefit gained from moving to a more desirable rule from a less desirable
rule, assuming both rules were followed.
43. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality
of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006) (asking why, if "any first
year law student knows that judges make law constantly," Chief Justice John Roberts and other
sophisticated players insist on the pretense that judges are mere "umpires" who do not make the
law).
44. Cf Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281, 1307-10 (1976) (explaining the difference between the private dispute resolution and the
public law models of the courts, and discussing reasons why courts are advantaged, in some
circumstances, for producing desirable prospective rules). Scholars have recognized that courts
may be better positioned than legislatures to account for and weigh the preferences of otherwise
disadvantaged individuals and groups. See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Adjudication
Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variation on Separation of Powers, 18 J.
PuB. L. 339, 345-46 (1969) (explaining that courts are attractive forums for politically weaker
players).
45. But constitutional rule making is the most obvious example. See, e.g., Fiss, Against
Settlement, supra note 29, at 1089 (describing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), as a decision where "judicial power is used to eradicate the caste structure").
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ones the legislature reserves the power to change judicially formed rules does not mean
judicial rule making cannot result in interim or permanent net positives for society.46
Preferable dispute resolution mechanism. Apart from rule making, a distinct
consequentialist justification for public adjudication is that it avoids the diffuse but
significant social negatives associated with forcing players into "self-help." Put
differently, providing relief to the injured (via damages) or the to-be-injured (via
injunctive relief) through a public, impartial process that is subject to fixed evidentiary
rules and intended to be "fair" to both parties is a superior means of redressing harms
than the alternatives, which have significant social costs.
47
Accessible public judging reduces the likelihood that an aggrieved party will engage
in undesirable efforts to self-remediate, such as injuring the claimed defendant through
physical violence, engaging in theft, practicing economic vigilantism (e.g., offsetting
the claimed debt against obligations otherwise not in dispute), or initiating a
reputational attack. Self-help can have considerable collateral damage and is in any
event likely only by coincidence to constitute the socially optimal level of deterrence or
result in the proper level of compensation (if any) for the victim.
48
Parties lacking the capacity or desire to engage in self-help (who resign themselves
to "lumping'A9 the injury), may develop antisocial attitudes that contribute to a general
sense of noncooperativeness and refusal to abide by societal norms and the law.
50
Society is lubricated by trust and internalized norms of conduct; actors do not expect
that they need monitor other players 100% of the time and thus do not do so.51 Part of
this is because all players expect that public adjudication will be available to resolve
disputes and redress injury. Ifpublic adjudication is unavailable, the benefits society at
46. See Luban, supra note 28, at 2636. "[E]nunciation of a legal rule by a court generates a
provisional resting point-provisional, because political forces can repeal a statute or undo a
legal rule, but a resting point nonetheless." Id. Of course, judicial rule making can result in
undesirable rules as well. See infra Part II.C.
47. See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). "The right to
sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government." Id.
48. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-71 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). "The courts provide the mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes that
might otherwise give rise to attempts at self-help." Id.
49. Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 4, 14 (1983) (defining "lumping it" as resigned acceptance of the injured party that no
worthwhile remedy can be pursued).
50. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (legal compliance
more likely when players perceive legal system as fair). See also Tom R. Tyler & John M.
Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the
Legitimacy ofLegal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 707, 714-17 (2000) (describing role of internalized norms and morals on behavior).
51. As the second Justice Harlan memorably put it: "[W]ith the ability to seek regularized
resolution of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables them to
strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized society."
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
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large experiences from having players who generally follow the rules will be
lessened.
2
C. Counterarguments
Of course, as should be obvious, counterarguments to both types of rationales
abound. One can disagree about whether fundamental notions of fairness, deliberative
democracy, and humans' hardwiring are correct, or that they are relevant at all.53 As for
consequentialist rationales, one can believe that rules derived from particular cases
may have uncertain application at large and thus have the wrong deterrent effect; that
the court system may be so costly that it is an inferior dispute resolution system
compared to informal reputational policing or private resolution; and/or that the social
change effected by litigation is often undesirable. 54 If these criticisms were on balance
correct, there would be reason not to subsidize court use at all or even to abolish in
large part the civil justice system.5 5 But I do not subscribe to that view. I believe that,
even accepting that the listed positives have some degree of merit, a monolithic
subsidy may nonetheless be unnecessary.56 Prior to the consideration of reform,
52. Moreover, widespread perception that significant portions of society lack or have
grossly unequal access to a crucial good or service increases the likelihood of massive political
change, whether it be accomplished peacefully or, in less stable systems, through insurrection.
For example, several scholars trace the introduction of social health insurance in Germany to
Otto van Bismarck's fear that, absent such measures, the German government would face
revolution. See, e.g., Josd Brunner, Trauma in Court: Medico-Legal Dialectics in the Late
Nineteenth-Century German Discourse on Nervous Injuries, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 697,
707 (2003) (attributing Bismarck's extensive social insurance policies to a desire "to stem the
rise of socialism by means of laws intended to curb the frustration and dissatisfaction of
workers"). If a critical good or service is functionally available only to those inside the castle
walls or rich enough to bribe their way in, the risk that those walls will be knocked down
increases. See also Luban, supra note 28, at 2627 ("Lawmaking is in one sense the antithesis of
revolutionary politics .... ).
53. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy
Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECoN. 281 (2001); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (arguing that
"fairness" concerns should be afforded no evaluative importance in constructing legal policy);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto
Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 63 (1999). For one of the many responses to Kaplow and
Shavell, see Ward Farnsworth, The Tastefor Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1992, 1993 (2002)
(reviewing Louis KAPLOW & STEvEN SHAvELL, FAmNESS VERsus WELFARE (2002)) (arguing that
"notions of justice and fairness have a legitimate and probably inevitable place in the making of
legal policy").
54. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982)
(arguing that undesirable common law rules will result from strategic play by aggressive
litigants).
55. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 199, 199
(claiming that "a truly free society requires liberating the law from state control to allow for the
development of a market for law"); cf Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting andIncentives To Comply
with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (1993) (suggesting that some arguments in favor of
subsidization rest upon uncertain foundations).
56. See infra Part IV.
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however, one must examine the state of the current subsidy and explore measurement
metrics that, moving forward, will increase the subsidy's transparency and make
intelligible the possibility of a differentiated subsidy.
III. COSTING AND MEASURING THE SUBSIDY
Surprisingly, the subsidy is, in even the grossest terms, poorly measured. An
obvious obstacle to convenient measurement is the federalist nature of the American
justice system; no aggregate number reflecting the total expenditures for all the
nation's distinct judicial systems is readily available.5 7 Each sovereign categorizes its
expenditures differently (for example, some do not include capital expenditures in the
judicial budget),58 and, in any event, adding up court-related expenditures from each
overstates the subsidy to the extent civil justice expenditures (compared to criminal)
are not separately itemized. 59 A fair estimate is that the subsidy runs, in cost terms
(rather than the benefit conferred), in the tens of billions of dollars annually.
Yet total expenditure numbers are of very limited use for evaluative and reform
purposes. As explored below, the subsidy is not time-tracked or cost-unitized in a way
that renders it transparent or readily susceptible to disaggregation along lines that
would be useful in evaluating the level of social positive flowing from the subsidization
of certain court activities or litigants. 60 Moreover, to the extent the subsidy should be
abolished for some players in some cases,61 accurate measurement of the subsidy
would be necessary to determine what they owe.
57. The federal government's expenditure is the largest, and California's is the largest of
the states. In 2008, the federal judiciary received an appropriation of $6.2 billion. JOHN G.
ROBERTS, JR., 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2008). California's
proposed judicial budget for 2009 was approximately $4.0 billion. Welcome to California's
Governor's Budgetfor 2009-2010, http://2009-I0.archives.ebudget.ca.gov/StateAgencyBudgets
/0010/agency.html. The federal court system deals only with a small number of the overall
claims filed. For example, in 2002 there were 97,887,356 actions filed in state courts and
1,835,412 actions filed in federal district courts. James P. George, Access to Justice, Costs, and
LegalAid, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 296 (2006).
58. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE PA. COURTS, Court Finances-Fiscal Year2006-2007,
in ANNUAL REPORT 2007 at 93, 95 tbl.4.1 (capital expenditures not included), available at
http://www.aopc.org/NR/rdonlyres/C28B66E2-694F-4CAO-8ADB-67436322A7E5/0/26finance
06.pdf.
59. Most activity in the nation's court system is civil. See, e.g., STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF
JUDGES PROGRAMS, 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, LEONIDAS
RALPH MECHAM 11 (2004) (286,053 pending civil cases and 65,619 criminal cases in 2004, with
similar ratios in earlier years).
60. In discussing the civil justice system generally, scholars have bemoaned the lack of
granular data regarding its usage. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 20, at 1281 (suggesting we
know more about "on-base averages of baseball players in the nineteenth century than we do
about our civil justice system"); Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know
About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 35, 38 (discussing disaggregative
shortcomings in current system).
61. See infra Part IV.
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A. Cost-Minute Accounting
The judicial subsidy is not currently unitized in a way that reveals useful
information about where the subsidy is going. For example, federal and state courts
track the number of cases pending, so calculating the average subsidy per case can be
readily performed: simply determine the aggregate court expenditure for a year and
divide by the number of cases in the courts that year. The average subsidy per litigant
could similarly be computed. Yet both numbers would be of severely limited value as
evaluative metrics. The judicial subsidy is not paid out on a per-average-case or per-
average-litigant basis; what is subsidized for each case and each litigant is court time
actually consumed.62 The relevant unit of consumption and cost is time.63
Court personnel's time can be monetized straightforwardly: for each case, the time a
court employee (including a judge) spends on the case is measurable via time tracking,
which can be monetized by multiplying minutes expended by the staffer's
compensation rate. For example, if the judge's annual compensation is X, and the
judge has Y work minutes (or whatever temporal unit) in a year, then one can arrive at
an X/Y dollars-per-minute cost-value of the judge's time, and the value of the "judge
subsidy" for a given case. 64 Similar calculations can be performed with the time of
other court personnel. The result would be useful labor-compartmentalized cost-minute
measurements of the subsidy-for district judge use, magistrate judge use, staff
attorney use, law clerk use, etc. 65 Nor is cost-minute accounting's applicability limited
62. In other words, litigants effectively receive a transfer payment worth the cost value of
the court's time.
63. For case-weighting purposes, the Federal Judicial Center undertook a study to
determine the average time, in (noncosted) minutes, that federal district court judges spend on
particular cases (and specified events within the case). See PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL
KRAFKA, 2003-2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY (2005), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/pages/665 [hereinafter FEDERAL CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY].
Of the previous ten federal weighting studies done, the 2003-2004 study was the first to
estimate minutes per court event. Id. at 9.
64. Average cost-minute estimates were used in two private studies of the costs of the civil
justice systems of the federal government and of California, Washington, and Florida in the
1980s. See JAMES S. KAKALIK & ABBY EISENSHTAT ROBYN, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDrrIREs FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES (1982)
[hereinafter RAND TORT STUDY]; JAMES S. KAKALIK & R.L. Ross, RAND INST. FOR CrvIL
JUSTICE, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF
CIVIL CASES (1983) [hereinafter RAND Ctvu. STUDY]. Minutes consumed were estimated based
on surveys and interviews, and costing was done per "judge package," that is, including the
judge and all his or her support staff. RAND CrvnL STUDY, supra at vi-ix; RAND TORT STUDY,
supra at viii-xii. No distinction was made between judges, magistrates, staff attorneys, or law
clerks; the judge's cost minute included those other costs. RAND CIVIL STUDY, supra at ix-xi;
RAND TORT STUDY, supra at xii. Assuming the judge is the most highly compensated
employee, this calculation overstates the subsidy given in "judge-light" cases where most of the
work was done by nonjudge personnel, and understates the subsidy in "judge-heavy" cases
where most of the work was done by the judge. Nonetheless, the studies confirm the descriptive
usefulness of the cost-minute metric.
65. Some have praised the role of the modem law clerk, see, e.g., Making the Casefor Law
Clerks: An Interview with Judge Alex Kozinski, 3 LONG TERM VIEw 55 (1995), while others
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to personnel. Cost-minutes (including amortized capital expenditures) associated with
courthouse use can be similarly determined.
Cost-minute tracking is a powerful practical and theoretical tool that permits
measurement of the cost of the subsidy in a transparent and easily disaggregable way.
Cost-minute tracking would quickly reveal the cost-minutes consumed per individual
case and could fairly easily show the cost-minutes consumed per case event. In
addition, because the subject matter of cases filed in the federal system and in most
state systems is already reliably recorded, cost-minute accounting could be used to
determine the subject matter cost-minutes that a particular court (or circuit, division, or
department) devotes to different types of cases (e.g., antitrust versus asbestos cases).
Indeed, were cost-minutes tracked for events within each case (conferences, non-
dispositive motions, dispositive motions, trials, etc.), information about the actual
public cost of different components ofthe dispute resolution process would be readily
obtainable.6 6 For example, the 2003-2004 Federal Case- Weighting Study (the first
federal weighting study to formally estimate time per case event) supplied estimates of
the average time consumed by pretrial events, such as dispositive motion resolution,
and included in its estimates judicial time spent outside of the courtroom (reading
briefs, doing legal research, drafting opinions) in particular types of cases.6 7 Such
granularity in measurement is a far better indicator of where subsidy dollars are going
than is merely recording and collecting the number of case filings of a particular
subject-matter type.6
B. The Desirability of Measurement
Robust cost-minute measurement is not currently done on an ongoing basis.69 Only
a handful of academic or administrative studies have been done on the topic, and those
have expressed worry, see, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Law
Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (2007). The debate would
no doubt benefit from having a robust and actual measurement of law clerk activity.
66. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 107 n.3 (1994) (noting that the RAND CIVIL
STUDY, supra note 64, which estimated cost per case event, showed that notwithstanding the
infrequency of trials, roughly half of the aggregated court expenditure was for trials).
67. See FEDERAL CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY, supra note 63, at 13-14.
68. See id. at 60-62. There were far fewer antitrust cases (751) than asbestos cases
(13,402), yet because antitrust cases required more judge time than asbestos cases (1520 to 54
average minutes), antitrust cases-and thus antitrust litigants-absorbed a larger percentage of
the federal judicial subsidy. Id. One side benefit to policy makers in keeping ongoing track of
cost minutes per case per subject matter is that it will give rule makers a sense of the
adjudicative costs or savings associated with modifying the underlying law in a given subject
area. For example, tort reform saves less (in judicial subsidy terms) when it bars suits which, on
average, consume only modest amounts ofjudicial resources.
69. See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 120 n.83 (1983)
("Assessing what a case costs the public is notoriously difficult."). Cost-minute tracking would
make it considerably easier. For a very rough guess at today's average court costs, we can take
the RAND cost estimates and simply adjust them for inflation. For example, the RAND estimate
for the average expenditure per federal tort case was $1740 in 1982. RAND TORT STUDY, supra
note 64, at xxi. In 2009 dollars that would be $3807.14. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer
2010] 1543
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
(although thoughtfully done) were significantly limited in scope. 70 Whatever the
reasons as to why the judicial subsidy has not been measured with precision in the past,
none are sufficiently persuasive to justify inadequate measurement of the subsidy
moving forward.7
When the assumption is that the subsidy should be monolithic, there is little
incentive to measure cost-minutes, other than for reasons of transparency. That is, if
the subsidy is unfailingly paid out, why incur the trouble of calculating it for each
litigant? The only rationale in that case would be transparency. But to the extent the
subsidy is not monolithic and some court use should not be subsidized, measurement
makes operative sense, because it constitutes the "bill" for the non-subsidized litigant.
As for subsidized activities and litigants, it is desirable to track cost-minutes to
Price Index Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (the "Inflation
Calculator" was used to generate all estimates of 2009 dollar values in this footnote). For
"contracts and other civil complaints," the average cost was $1890. RAND CrL STUDY, supra
note 64, at xvii. In 2009 dollars that would be $4135.34. Average costs were lower in state
courts. Id.
Combining the RAND cost-minute numbers and the Federal Case- Weighting Study average
minutes per case of a given subject matter is another very rough method of guessing at today's
court costs. In 1982, RAND's calculation of a cost minute for a federal district court judge
(including all support staff) was $9.41. RAND CIVIL STUDY, supra note 64, at x; RAND TORT
STUDY, supra note 64, at xiv. Again assuming (likely wrongly) for the sake of argument that the
only difference as to 2009's cost minute is inflation, then value of a "judge plus staff' cost
minute today would be $20.59. The average judge minutes (not inclusive of other personnel's
time) per case in various subject areas was set forth in the Federal Case- Weighting Study. Supra
note 63, at 60-62.
So, although the cost and time numbers need to be adjusted accordingly (to reflect proper
weighing of nonjudge time), using the unadjusted numbers, one can arrive at rough, ballpark
numbers for the average cost per federal case of a given type, namely, $20.59 times estimated
minutes per case of a given subject matter. Using that formula, the average cost numbers look
higher than simply inflation adjusting the RAND numbers. For the average federal civil case
terminated in 2002 (the data set of the weighting study), the cost would be approximately $9300
($20.59 times all judge minutes divided by cases terminated). Regarding particular subject
matter: the average approximate cost of an insurance contract dispute is $12,700; a personal
injury dispute, $8200; an ERISA dispute, $7600; and an asbestos dispute, $1100 (according to
my own calculations). Average numbers are of course misleading because trials are by far the
most time consuming (and thus costly) event. See FEDERAL CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY, supra note
63, at app. Q (breaking down average estimated time per case event in different subject areas).
But trials only happen in a small percentage of cases. See, e.g., RAND CIVIL STUDY, supra note
64, at xiii (finding that trials occur very infrequently); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year
Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1256-60 (2005)
(concluding that trials are rare).
70. See supra Part III.A.
71. A concern that time tracking is an unacceptable practical burden (as opposed to an
invasion into judicial deliberations) seems overblown. Technological advances make the
recording and collection of such data far less onerous than in days past; after all, private lawyers
do it all the time. Nobody likes to time track. But doing so here is a public service, and to the
extent it assists in recouping some of the judicial subsidy, the additional effort pays for itself
That is, for those who fear time spent recording time will be time not spent adjudicating,
recaptured subsidies can be used to hire additional judges, increasing the overall judge minutes
available.
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determine whether a particular category of activity or litigant is worth the cost of the
subsidy.
An objection that could have force even in a partial-subsidy world might be that
precise measurement-where court staff keeps track of time on a per-event, per-case
basis-might constitute an undue invasion of the privacy ofjudicial deliberation. Put
differently, ifjudges are concerned that the amount of time they spend on a particular
case, or a particular element of a case, is discoverable, then fear of criticism---that a
judge spent too much or too little time on a particular thing-may undermine judicial
competence and result in judging to avoid criticism, rather than judging to reach the
right result. Because judicial decisions are public, however, one would not expect that
criticism related to time expended would materially outweigh criticism of the result,
and the latter will occur in any event. Judges are well aware their substantive rulings
will be watched and criticized; an additional amount of time-based criticism seems
unlikely to negatively affect judicial conduct.
Lack of transparent, robust measurement has no doubt been in part attributable to
reflexive internalization of the consonant rationales. 72 Put another way, there is likely a
deep-seated, intuitive conviction among Americans that to charge user fees of any type
for court access is "unjust." 73 Under that view, measurement serves little apparent
purpose.
While this may explain the past lack of measurement, it does not constitute an
argument against accurate measurement moving forward. First, accurate cost
measurement is not an argument against the current subsidy; as mentioned, simply for
transparency reasons, it would be desirable to track with precision how a public
resource is being utilized.7 4 But more importantly, while attitudes may well be settled
regarding the fundamental opposition to some types of user fees (i.e., fees for
indigents), I doubt, if pressed, that all observers would be inimically opposed to the
possibility of certain court usage fees. It is understandable to resist accurate costing
(given the effort it requires) when the apparent choice is binary---either the status quo
monolithic subsidy or a pure user-pays alternative-particularly when the second
option is considered to be per se unacceptable. Yet the choice is not binary; there is an
enormous amount of cognitive space between a complete subsidy and no subsidy.
Accurate costing permits us to knowledgeably explore the middle ground of a
differentiated subsidy.
Of course, costing is only halfthe story; the other half is disaggregation by relevant
variable, that is, to select variables that are correlative with the existence or level of
social positives and imagine possible adjustments to the subsidy. To that I turn my
attention next.
72. See supra Part II.A.
73. See Brunet, supra note 35, at 930-31 (noting that some oppose measurement on the
ground that "'justice' should not be quantified or measured").
74. Transparency in government action and expenditure, happily, is a concern of both the
current President and Congress. See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government from
Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the.pressoffice/
transparencyandopengovemment/; Damian Paletta & Michael R. Crittenden, TARP Oversight
Panel Urges Transparency, Accountability, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123151863031268319.html.
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IV. REIMAGIN1NG THE JUDICIAL SUBSIDY
Given the severe undermeasurement of the subsidy as it is currently constituted,
"shovel-ready" proposals of reform are premature. At a minimum, more accurate
measurement and additional empirical research must occur.75 Nonetheless,
consideration of potential reform and an analytical roadmap thereto can aid in the
development of a reform and research agenda.
Logically, resistance to eliminating the subsidy rests upon some combination of the
consonant and consequential rationales, namely that (1) it is fundamentally "wrong" to
charge for court usage costs because it conflicts with fundamental notions about
76fairness, human nature, or the ideal operation of a democratic society, and/or (2) it is
consequentially undesirable because court usage fees will prevent some suits from
being litigated that, had they been pursued, would have generated a net increase in
overall social welfare.
77
Surely, consonant and consequentialist objections persuasively demonstrate the
undesirability of the polar opposite of the status quo, namely, the monolithic user-fee
model, where every player in every case must pay court usage fees.78 (Indeed, because
of the consonant rationales alone, one can comfortably predict that no pure user-pays
model will ever get serious consideration.) However, both consonant and
consequentialist concerns have less force in a user-fee model that is differentiated, such
as one that is responsive to the nature of the players, the nature of the court action
being subsidized, and the respective "fault" of the parties for court costs.79 Put another
way, the different subsidy rationales almost certainly attach with significant force only
to certain types of activities and certain types of players. With a bit of conceptual
disaggregation-by asking, does subsidizing court activity with characteristic X, or
litigant with characteristic Y, result in significant social positives, or alternatively, does
75. Ideally, policy makers will pay attention. But that is not always so. As Professors
Clermont and Eisenberg noted with classic resigned understatement: "There is a demand-side
problem as well as a supply-side problem with empirical studies: almost nobody in power pays
attention to the few studies that do exist." Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 119, 135 (2002) (discussing data in connection with discovery
reform).
76. See supra Part II.A.
77. See supra Part II.B. Certainly, administrative concerns about a differentiated subsidy
(concerns that may also trigger or aggravate consonant or consequentialist worries) are
ultimately relevant. But my limited aim here is to focus on addressing theoretical concerns,
which, in my view, analytically precede (but certainly do not moot) administrative concerns.
78. But cf Rex E. Lee, Address, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay
the Costs ofLitigation?, 34 CAT. U. L. REv. 267 (1985) (urging consideration of a pure user-
pays model, with skepticism toward even an exception for the indigent). Consonant rationales
likewise operate with great force against proposals to simply increase filing fees significantly (a
straightforward and undifferentiated reduction of the subsidy), which would by definition
threaten access for the disadvantaged.
79. Indeed, regarding the question of which actors should bear attorneys' fees-
specifically, whether losers should subsidize or "indemnify" some or all of the winners' fees-it
was long ago noted that perhaps in "certain classes of cases" the loser should bear costs. See
Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REv.
26, 27 (1969). Conceptual differentiation could similarly be applied to the judicial subsidy.
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not subsidizing activity X or player Y deprive us of social positives?-one can begin to
construct a differentiated subsidy that fairly separates court use that should be
subsidized from court use that should not.
Filtering the consonant and consequentialist rationales through the evaluative
heuristic developed herein, I propose considering the following differentiated subsidy.
Imagine that first, upon case termination, each litigant would be obligated to pay one-
half of the court usage costs.80 Second, to ensure court access, a generous "access"
subsidy would be extended to a significant percentage of litigants.81 Third, to
encourage the consequentialist positive of rule making and the consonant positive of
value expression, cost minutes related to appellate court use would be fully
subsidized.8 2 Fourth, a retributive "loser-pays" tax-where a losing litigant must pay
the court usage costs of both litigants, except when either of the two foregoing
exemptions apply to the loser-would be levied.83 Under this model, a material portion
of the current subsidy might be recaptured, without significantly frustrating the social
positives that result from public adjudication.
A. A Generous Access Subsidy
Satisfying consonant and consequentialist concerns. The deep intuitive appeal of
the consonant rationales, the richness with which they have been historically expressed,
and the firmness with which they are attached to the modem America perception of
itself cannot be understated. But I believe current thinking confuses depth with breadth.
Without marginalizing the power of the consonant rationales, in practical terms it
seems the primary consonant fear of subsidy elimination is that such would result in a
denial of court access to disadvantaged members of society. That, clearly, is an
unacceptable negative. But to functionally deny a poor person court access because he
or she cannot pay court usage costs is a very different matter than to require one who
can truly afford court costs to bear them. In the latter case, court access becomes a
matter of choice, and a player's real choice to pay or to not pay costs does not offend
our fundamental presumptions about how the world should be.
From the consequentialist perspective, an access subsidy similarly achieves the
social positive of avoiding destructive self-help--which is perhaps the central negative
consequence of a denial of courthouse access. Financially disadvantaged players are
those who are most likely to engage in violent self-help, or to develop attitudes
inconsistent with the social norms largely responsible for the peaceful and reasonably
orderly interactions of daily life. s4 A closed courthouse door for the disadvantaged may
80. In cases involving more than two parties, usage costs would be prorated per side. For
ease of discussion, I assume two litigants per case. In the event of settlement, each party would
owe half of the court usage costs, subject to the exemptions discussed here; for example, a
wholly subsidized "access" litigant would not owe any court usage costs in the case of
settlement.
81. See infra Part IV.A.
82. See infra Part IV.B.
83. See infra Part IV.C. The retributive tax does not apply if a case settles.
84. Wealthier players are more likely to be able to pursue peaceful means of remediation;
for example, even absent a legal remedy, a manufacturer may lawfully threaten to withhold
future business from a supplier unless a dispute is resolved favorably. Wealthier players also
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lead to either undesirable forms of self-help or alienation. Asking those who can afford
to pay usage costs to do so is far less likely to have such an effect.
The case of court filing fees is illustrative. Filing fees are a near universal
requirement, with frequent exception for indigents.8 5 We accept filing fees, and the
indigent exception, because the imposition of filing fees upon those who can afford
them does not undermine the consonant social positives of justice, democracy, and
innate fairness, or the consequentialist positive of avoiding self-help, because access is
not threatened.86 So too should it be with court usage costs. By subsidizing needy
players, we would ensure access-preserving the consonant and consequentialist social
positives-but still reduce the overall cost of the subsidy, as some players will require
no access assistance.
Constructing the subsidy. The first step in thinking about the size and form of an
access subsidy for certain players is to identify the problems an access subsidy is
expected to remedy. Access denials arise in a user-pays model for two primary reasons:
(1) risk aversion and (2) illiquidity.87 Using the expected-value model of litigation,
both can be stated succinctly.
Risk-averse players are those who are not indifferent to the uncertainty around an
expected value. In the litigation context, risk-averse players are those who will not
pursue litigation with a positive expected return, that is, litigation that should be
pursued, because they cannot tolerate the loss outcome. 88 Imagine the following
possibilities for a piece of litigation: (1) a 50% chance of netting $10 (win $25, pay
contingent lawyer $10, pay court $5) or (2) a 50% chance of losing $5 (win $0, pay
contingent lawyer $0, pay court $5), for an expected value of $2.50. If the "litigation
bet" were actually with numbers of that size, few people would be risk averse; they
would litigate. But if the numbers were 1000 times larger (expected return of $2500,
have more to lose from self-help efforts that violate legal or liability rules. See supra Part II.B.
85. See generally Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma
Pauperis Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 (1985) (discussing federal
indigent exemption); John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV.
361 (1923) (discussing historical and contemporary treatment of indigent litigants in England
and America).
86. I am using justice, democracy, and innate fairness as shorthand for the three species of
consonant positive described in Part II.A. Observers who believe filing fees do result, in
practice, in denial of access to disadvantaged litigants often couch their arguments in terms of
asserted violations of what this Article has called consequentialist or consonant positives.
87. Cf Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59
VAND. L. REv. 729, 765 (2006) (noting risk-aversion and liquidity issues as barriers to
arbitration access). Even though risk-aversion and liquidity concerns are slightly different in the
arbitration setting-because arbitration fees need to paid up front-the concerns still apply in a
user-pays court costs model.
88. In contrast, risk neutrality is when a player values outcomes based on expected value
alone. To a risk-neutral player, an uncertain outcome that will pay him $100 50% of the time
and nothing the other 50% of the time (expected value = $50) is equivalent to simply receiving a
certain sum of $50. See John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32
EcoNOMETRICA 122 (1964); see also KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-
BEARING 90 (197 1) ("A risk averter is defined as one who, starting from a position of certainty,
is unwilling to take a bet which is actuarially fair .... "). For risk-neutral players, litigation
decisions are based on the expected value of the case; that is, the expected gain minus the
expected costs of litigation (now including expected court costs).
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but possible loss of $5000), many people simply would not risk taking the $5000 loss.
Risk-averse players can easily be effectively denied court access in a user-pays
system.
8 9
Illiquidity is a different problem (although often risk-averse players also face
liquidity problems). For example, assume a litigant is seeking an expected
nonmonetary gain from suit that impartial assessors agree "exceeds" his expected
costs, for example, custody of a child. Whereas the risk-averse litigant feared a loss
outcome, an illiquid litigant has a problem even if he or she wins, as children cannot be
used to satisfy court costs (whereas monetary awards can).90 Certainly it would
undermine both the consonant and consequentialist rationales if access were denied
under such circumstances.
Thus, an ideal subsidy should address risk-aversion and liquidity concerns, and to
ensure access, the subsidy should err on the side ofoverinclusiveness. After all, even if
it covered 50% of all litigants, it would be less than the current expenditure.
Unfortunately, no robust breakdown of court use by income or wealth of the litigants is
available, nor are comprehensive and reliable particularized estimates of current court
costs available.9' Accordingly, it is impossible to determine exactly how large a
generous access subsidy need be.
Nonetheless, a sensible framework might be one that exempts 92 zero to modest
income players (a significant portion of individuals, small private businesses, and
nonprofits) entirely and caps the responsibility for higher-income litigants at some
small percentage of income, for example, 1-2% of a litigant's reported federal income
above the exempt level.93 For organizations (as opposed to individuals) above a certain
size, no cap would be necessary. Larger organizations-particularly public
corporations and insurance companies, two frequent litigants-have significant assets,
easy access to capital markets, and fair access to liability insurance policies 94 that make
it extremely unlikely that bearing half of court costs95 would amount to a functional
denial of court access.
96
89. A common explanation of why people are risk averse is the diminishing marginal utility
of money; that is, the first dollar is worth more than the millionth dollar, because the first dollar
buys things like food (necessities), whereas the millionth dollar buys diamonds (luxuries). See,
e.g., STEvEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186 (1987).
90. Note that even a risk-neutral player would not proceed with otherwise desirable
litigation in a user-pays court costs system if the player had a liquidity problem regarding
satisfying those costs in the case of a win.
91. Very rough approximations of cost can be calculated by updating for inflation the
estimates from the RAND studies. See supra note 64.
92. However, I still imagine a modest filing fee that only the indigent are exempt from,
which would be the same as the current filing fee model.
93. If the case settles, the subsidized litigant's half share of the total costs would be based
on usage costs to date. Income information would be filed under seal with the court, and not
disclosed to one's adversary, to prevent strategic play.
94. Under my suggested framework, liability insurance policies would almost certainly
begin to cover court costs.
95. Or all of the costs in the case of a loss. See infra Part IV.C.
96. Indeed, corporate organizations and insurance companies are very often defendants, and
corporations above a certain size are presumptively risk neutral, at least with respect to a risk the
size of court costs. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
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Theoretically, such a regime could prevent access denial, by addressing risk-
aversion and liquidity concerns, while recapturing a significant portion of the current
subsidy. Two observations on subsidy recapture are worth noting. First, in a large
percentage of cases, a defendant is being sued because it has resources sufficient to
satisfy judgment or settle.97 The defendant is thus unlikely to qualify for the access
subsidy discussed above. Organizations-mostly business entities-are involved in a
significant number of cases as both defendants and plaintiffs.98 Such players
presumably consume a considerable portion of the judicial subsidy that is susceptible
to recoupment. Second, the vast majority of cases settle before trial, and trials are the
most time-consuming (and thus, in terms of the judicial subsidy, costliest) event of a
lawsuit. 99 Cases that settle early will likely involve modest court costs that are at least
in part affordable by a significant number of those litigants who are not 100% exempt
from costs.1
00
B. A Rule-Making and Value-Expression Subsidy
A crucial consequentialist justification for subsidizing public judging is rule
making, and the consonant analog might be fairly described as value expression.' 0' The
prosubsidy argument rests in part upon the view that, upon the charging of court usage
fees, fewer suits will be brought, and less rule making and value expression will
occur. 0 2 That concern, although not illogical, should be of modest practical impact,
assuming a generous access subsidy.103 That is, without denying the considerable
positives attributable to public judging, subsidy elimination-with an exception for
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 130 n.66 (1996) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 572 (4th ed. 1992)) (explaining risk neutrality of corporations and insurers).
97. Most civil suits are for damages, and many are filed because the defendant is expected
by a contingent-fee plaintiff's lawyer to be able to pay a settlement or judgment. Plaintiffs'
lawyers' filing guesses should be fairly accurate signals about defendants' ability to pay, or the
plaintiffs' bar would not be in business.
98. Indeed, as Professor Hadfield has shown, organizations (which are mostly business
entities) are involved in a significant number of federal cases as defendants (and also as
plaintiffs). See Hadfield, supra note 20, at 1298 (noting that organizations are defendants in
more than 80% of all nonprisoner, nonstudent loan, nonforeclosure federal litigation, and
plaintiffs in more than 30%).
99. See FEDERAL CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY, supra note 63, at app. Y, tbl.4 (identifying the
percentage likelihood of trials in cases of varying subject matter); Galanter, supra note 69, at
1256-60 (finding that trials are rare); RAND CIVIL STUDY, supra note 64, at xiii (finding that
trials are the most costly element of litigation in terms of public resources consumed, but occur
rarely).
100. Both RAND studies noted that in general the public expenditure in a given case was
small because most cases settle. RAND CIVIL STUDY, supra note 64, at xiii-xv; RAND TORT
STUDY, supra note 64, at xi-xiii.
101. The appeal of adjudication as a dispute resolution mechanism over self-help was the
other consequentialist justification. See supra Part II.B. But a generous access subsidy likely
addresses the vast majority of players who might succumb to the temptation to engage in costly
self-help. See supra Part [V.A.
102. See supra Part II.
103. See supra Part IV.A.
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appeals-seems unlikely to result in materially less rule making and value expression
than that which arises from the current subsidy.
Eliminating the monolithic subsidy raises the price of going to court (for all players
not wholly covered by the access subsidy). If the price of any item is raised, there are
three logical possibilities. First, a player might choose a less costly substitute. Second,
a player might forego the item entirely. Third, the player might still consume the
item-because even at the increased price, the item is still a desirable purchase. The
more there are of the last type of player, the less effect a price increase will have on the
quantity of the item demanded (here court use).
With the above in mind, consider that there are in essence two categories of legal
dispute: (1) one for which a party has an ex ante contract for binding alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) with a potential adversary, and (2) one for which the party
does not. For category (1) players, an increase in the "court price" should have no
material effect on filings. Those players have already chosen a less costly substitute for
litigation: ADR.
It is category (2) where an increase in the court price could have a significant effect.
A party is in category (2) because it (i) lacks the bargaining power (or legal ability) to
get a potential adversary to agree to binding ADR; because (ii) the dispute was not
expected to occur at all or with a particular adversary (many torts); or because (iii) the
party could have ex ante contracted with the adversary but believed the courts would
be more attractive than ADR. Let us consider the three possibilities in reverse order.
The reason a player is in category (2)(iii) is because the player prefers the court to
ADR. Of course, even with the present subsidy, courts are considerably more
expensive (because of higher legal fees and increased discovery costs) than ADR.1 4
Almost certainly, category (2)(iii) players chose to be in court because they can obtain
something from the court not obtainable in ADR that is worth the increased legal bill.
If the "court price" increases, category (2)(iii) players will only stop filing lawsuits to
the extent that the expected court usage fee for a potential dispute outweighs whatever
non-ADR-obtainable goal was previously thought to be worth the considerable cost
increase associated with litigation; category (2)(iii) players with that calculus will end
up in category (1) and thus file no suit. However, because court usage costs are a small
component of overall litigation costs, the extra cost associated with a user fee is
unlikely to move litigants who otherwise would have been in category (2)(iii) to
category (1).05
Players in categories (2)(ii) and (2)(i) are in a different position. They had no choice
to do ADR; such players must go to court to obtain relief. What effect will an increase
in the "court price" have? Will it cause significant numbers of these litigants to forego
suit? Or will most players litigate notwithstanding the increased court price? From a
104. See, e.g., Robert B. Moberly & Judith Kilpatrick, Introduction: The Arkansas Law
Review Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 ARK. L. REV. 161, 167-68 (2001)
(noting that legal fees and discovery costs are lower in alternative dispute resolution).
105. See JAMES S. KAKALiK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION xi fig.S.1 (1986) [hereinafter RAND
COMPENSATION STUDY] (finding that in tort cases, defendants' average legal fees and expenses
were nine times court expenditures and plaintiffs' average legal fees and expenses were twelve
times court expenditures); see also RAND CIVIL STUDY, supra note 64, at vii (finding that
"private expenditures far exceed government expenditures for the average case").
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litigant's perspective, seeking relief makes sense if the expected value of its claim
exceeds the cost of litigating the claim.'16 Eliminating the current subsidy means the
cost of litigating the claim increases by half of the expected court usage fee (because
each litigant only bears half of the court costs). For players who are risk neutral and
liquid with respect to the additional expected court cost obligation (either because of
their own financial status or because of the access subsidy), the only claims that will
not be brought-compared to the status quo--are those claims whose expected value
no longer exceeds the litigation cost. Given a generous access subsidy, and assuming
court usage costs are as small a fraction of overall legal costs as they appear to be, 10 7 it
seems unlikely a usage fee would drive very many claims from the courthouse (or
constitute tipping pressure to settle).
The foregoing strongly suggests that, given the realities of litigation, the number of
suits lost as a result of the abolition of the current subsidy (assuming a generous access
subsidy) should be small.108 Smaller still is the effect that those lost suits would have
had on rule making and value expression; only a small percentage of the suits not
brought would have, in any event, resulted in an opinion that actually affected the
future behavior of others. 
0 9
I suspect the calculus changes for appeals. "0 That is, while I cautiously believe no
significant loss of rule making or value expression will occur for eliminating the
subsidy (other than the access subsidy) at the trial level, the risk to social positives is
higher at the appellate level. First, for appeals, court use costs are likely a more
significant portion of the incremental litigation costs associated with pursuing an
appeal. At the trial level, because of discovery and evidentiary disputes, the private-
106. See Drahozal, supra note 87, at 760 ("Under the expected value model of litigation, a
prospective claimant decides whether to file suit in court by comparing the costs and benefits of
litigation."). Regarding settlement, as opposed to filings: settlement behavior is difficult to
model and predict with certainty. Increased costs may make settlement slightly more likely, but,
because of the access subsidy, the small relative proportion of court costs, and bargaining issues,
it is difficult to expect the increase will be significant.
107. See supra note 105.
108. Put another way, for many, the consumer surplus associated with court use will still be
positive; consumer surplus can be thought of as simply the difference between price paid and
what a consumer would be willing to pay. See, e.g., Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper,
An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison ofAlternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655,
659 (1982) (defining consumer surplus).
109. See H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERs L. REv. 431, 431
(1986) ("The study of law focuses upon reported cases, which represent about two or three
percent of all suits which are instituted."). Trial courts have far less rule-making and value-
expressive power than appellate courts; the rule-making and value-expression social positives
associated with the lost increment (i.e., lost because there is no subsidy beyond an access
subsidy) of trial court decisions seems minimal, and tolerable.
110. Obviously suits not pursued at the trial level because of the elimination of the
monolithic subsidy will also result in fewer appeals. However, I expect the number of these "lost
decisions" to be small, as explained in the preceding text, and only a small percentage of those
lost decisions would have ever been appealed. When I consider the calculus for appeals, what I
mean to say is that I am considering the effect the absence of the appeal subsidy would have on
the incremental decision to appeal from suits that would be brought in an access-subsidy-only
world.
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litigation-cost-to-court-use-cost multiple is likely higher than the private-cost-to-
public-cost multiple at the appellate level (which is confined to legal disputes).
Accordingly, more players might decline to pursue appeals, given the higher marginal
cost associated with a user fee obligation. More importantly, however, appellate courts
obviously have greater rule-making power than lower courts; foregone appeals
therefore have a greater cost in lost rules. And value expression, of course, has
heightened force at the appellate level; indeed, that recognition, in part, drove Chief
Justice Earl Warren to seek unanimity in Brown v. Board ofEducation. "' Thus, public
monies saved by subsidy elimination appear outweighed, at the appellate level, by lost
social positives. Accordingly, an appeal subsidy to litigants-equal to the value of the
appellate court's cost minutes, excluding the cost minutes of the lower court-makes
sense in cases where the appellate court issues a written opinion."
1 2
Yet, here too, additional empirical data is crucial. If the reality is that trial court
usage costs are-contrary to the current assumption-in fact a sizeable fraction of the
litigation costs and expected value of many claims litigated by otherwise nonsubsidized
players, than the number of suits unfiled as a result of the removal of the current
subsidy could be significant. In that case, rule making and value expression could
materially suffer and extension of a subsidy to aportion oftrial court activities may be
warranted. " 
3
111. Edward N. Beiser, Book Review, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1945, 1947-52 (1976) (reviewing
RiCHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975)) (discussing Chief Justice Warren's efforts behind the
scenes to secure a unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
112. Cases settled before issuance of an opinion would not receive the subsidy; in that case,
little or no social positives would have resulted from the aborted appeal. One note regarding
those cases that do result in an opinion: opinions can, of course, be published or unpublished.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, recently amended, now prohibit court rules that bar
the citation of unpublished appellate opinions. FED. R. ApP. P. 32.1 (a). State rules on the subject
vary. See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing
Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 251, 258-85 (2001)
(collecting various rules). There is a profound debate in the literature regarding unpublished
decisions, their constitutionality, and the proper limits on their use. See, e.g., Richard B.
Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv.
755, 788-91 (2003) (expressing concern over nonprecedential opinions); Penelope Pether,
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the US. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv.
1435, 1504-14 (2004) (arguing that unpublished opinions further disadvantage marginalized
groups). However, for this Article's purposes, if an opinion is written, then given the
comprehensiveness of today's electronic databases, the opinion likely aids, at the very least, in
private ordering. I accordingly assume it makes sense to attribute some material level of social
positive to an "unpublished" (but readily discoverable) appellate opinion--even if a published
opinion generates a higher level of social positive or would have been more desirable. I may be
mistaken; perhaps voluminous unpublished opinions undermine rather than aid the
consequentialist social positives arising from rule making, by serving as a form ofjudicial noise.
I leave that to the consideration of the reader.
113. Much trial court activity is not directly concerned with rule making, only with
resolution of the dispute at bar. Analytically, it makes sense to only subsidize court activities
reasonably proximate to a published ruling (e.g., court time spent reading briefs, hearing
argument, doing research, drafting opinions). Court time spent at status conferences or on the
resolution of preliminary disputes (for which no written opinion is published) is less generative
of social positives than is court time spent producing decisions written for consideration by
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C. A Retributive Tax
What of winning or losing? Should that affect the parties' usage fee obligations? It
is useful to recall the different rules of cost shifting with respect to attorneys' fees."
4
Under the American Rule, both sides pay their own counsel fees, regardless of who
prevails. 115 Under the English Rule, the loser pays the winner's attorneys' fees. 116 The
core attraction of the English Rule is that it forces actors in the wrong (i.e., liable
defendants or nonmeritorious plaintiffs) to internalize the costs of their conduct. 1 7 An
asserted weakness of the English Rule is that, in such a regime, financially weak
players may have a meritorious claim with a positive expected value but be afraid to
pursue it because they would be financially devastated if the other side prevailed. "8 In
contrast, the theoretical attraction of the American Rule is that it does not deter risk-
averse litigants from pursuing or defending suit. The criticism of the American Rule is
that by not forcing bad actors to pay all costs generated by their conduct, theoretically
their undesirable behavior is underdeterred, that is, nonmeritorious suits and defenses
are encouraged." 19
future actors. See supra Part II.B. Private or near-private trial court decisions, that is, decisions
not put in writing or not readily discoverable to the legal community (such as many discovery
rulings), confer a de minimis societal benefit, if any. Informal, unwritten decision making that
moves a case along, that is, case management activity, primarily benefits the litigants, who wish
to resolve disputes expeditiously to avoid costs and/or to obtain relief. To the extent that case
management benefits the public, it does so because it prevents disputes from "clogging" the
system, that is, consuming judicial resources. But were such case management activities not
subsidized, litigants consuming them would pay an equivalent amount of the time value lost into
the public fisc.
114. To be clear, however, I am not proposing a shifting of attorneys' fees. In addition,
shifting of counsel fees is different than a retributive tax on usage costs, because in the latter
case the loser pays the state, not his opponent. Nonetheless, consideration of two different fee-
shifting rules on counsel fees will prove helpful.
115. See generally Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A TheoreticalAnalysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 55-65 (1982)
(discussing American and English rules). Critics of the American Rule complain that winning a
lawsuit but not being able to recover fees can make winners losers, by dint of large legal bills.
As the old saw goes, the only parties that win litigating are the lawyers. See, e.g., Gregory E.
Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney's Fees: Expanding the "Loser Pays" Rule in
Texas, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1915, 1919 (1994) (arguing that under the American Rule, "[o]nly the
lawyers... come out ahead").
116. See generally Goodhart, supra note 2, at 856-68 (discussing the English Rule in
English courts). Variations on the English Rule are widely applied throughout Europe. See
generally Wemer Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1984). Nonetheless, the term of art remains the "English Rule."
117. See, e.g., Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REv.
1161, 1161-63 (1996) (arguing that a loser-pays model deters "long-shot case[s]" with high
payoffs and "imposition-based case[s], whose settlement value arises from [the] threat of cost
infliction").
118. Shavell, supra note 115, at 61-62; see also RiCHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIs
OF LAW 539 (3d ed. 1986) (English Rule discourages litigation by risk-averse plaintiffs).
119. Interestingly, there is no broad consensus of the actual effects of the different rules. See
Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical
Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1943, 1948 (2002) (noting "surprisingly little
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Regarding court usage fees, a "loser-sometimes-pays" rule is conceptually
attractive. 20 The "sometimes" refers to the exemption applicable to "access" and
"appeal" subsidized litigants. A loss should not force an otherwise-subsidized loser to
pay an amount that exceeds his subsidized cost obligation.,2 Were that a possible
outcome, it would either undermine access (by deterring litigation by financially
disadvantaged litigants) or decrease the rule making and value expression associated
with appellate litigation (by deterring appeals). But there is some percentage of
situations that fall in neither category, that is, cases involving nonsubsidized losers. A
loser-sometimes-pays rule would require a nonsubsidized loser to pay to the state a tax
equal to the winner's half of costs (regardless of the winner's subsidized status), with
the winner absolved of any usage fee obligation to the state. 1
22
A party who has violated a rule or brought a baseless suit should not be able to
impose upon the victimized opponent half the costs of resolving the dispute. Nor is
there compelling reason why, in the case of a nonsubsidized loser, the taxpayer should
have to bear the share of costs that were, in essence, forced upon the winner by the
loser. If one accepts that judgments or verdicts are usually right, namely, that they
correctly identify whether violations have or have not occurred, then for fairness
reasons a retributive tax has appeal. The nonsubsidized loser "caused" the public to
expend resources adjudicating a claim or defense that lacked merit (and otherwise
advanced no social positive).123
Objections to the English Rule on attorneys' fee shifting have less force regarding a
retributive tax on usage fees. Because court usage costs are generally a fraction of
attorneys' fees,' 24 the group of players materially risk averse to bearing usage costs in
the event of a losing outcome will be a fraction of the group of litigants intimidated by
a loser-pays attorneys' fees rule. Second, because of the access subsidy, most players
whose litigation decisions would be undesirably chilled by the fear of having to pay
agreement" among those who have studied different fee-shifting regimes).
120. No shifting would occur in the event of settlement, although the parties would be free to
agree to bear different proportions of the court usage costs.
121. In many cases, a player's "subsidized usage cost obligation" would be zero (for totally
exempt players); thus no retributive tax would be imposed on wholly subsidized players. For a
partially subsidized ("capped") player, see supra Part IV.A, the tax would increase his owed
cost (including the retributive tax) to no more than what his capped obligation would have been
had the case been resolved that same day without any retributive tax. The winner's cost
obligation to the state, in both cases, would be waived. See also infra note 122. Since appellate
cost minutes are entirely subsidized for all players, they would not be included in any retributive
tax.
122. For example, if total court usage costs were $100, each litigant would have a gross cost
obligation of $50. Even if the winner was totally or partially subsidized, a nonsubsidized loser
would still have to pay a retributive tax of $50 to the state, on top of the $50 the loser owed for
his own costs. A loser who was himself protected by a cost obligation "cap" of $75, see supra
Part [V.A, would only have to pay $25 of the retributive tax (in addition to his own $50 in
costs); a loser who was totally covered by an access subsidy would pay no retributive tax. See
also supra note 121.
123. Under old English law, there was a similar moral justification for taxing the loser: "It
was believed that a person who resorted to the courts and lost his claim was morally at fault, and
at common law the unsuccessful party was fined, the revenue going to the king." Note,
Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 700 (1940).
124. RAND COMPENSATION STUDY, supra note 105, at xi.
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court costs will be shielded from an unbearable cost obligation. One of the reasons the
English Rule is workable elsewhere is because "litigation insurance" and other
financial assistance is available to needy litigants; here the access subsidy achieves the
same result (and it lacks the coverage problems associated with private insurance).125
Of course, while the negatives associated with the English Rule on fee shifting are
reduced when court costs are the obligation being shifted, so are its asserted positives.
Access-subsidized litigants will face little or no deterrent effect; court usage costs, as a
fraction of overall litigation costs, will likely have only a minor affect on litigation
behaviors of nonsubsidized litigants; and most cases settle, so often that no retributive
tax would be triggered. One needs to be careful to not overstate the effect of the tax, in
terms of deterring undesirable behavior. But the fairness appeal, and the modest public
money saved, weigh in favor of consideration of the tax.
CONCLUSION
For many, the free provision of public adjudication for all litigants is such an
intuitively correct idea that a searching analysis of the rationales for it, or a discussion
of potential reforms, is a waste of time. This apparently dominant view is a mistake. A
considered discussion of the subsidy as constituted (as opposed to a broad discussion
of the general merits of public adjudication) has not occurred systematically or within
any recognizable evaluative framework. That failure is a significant one, in my view,
because it deprives us of the theoretical tools with which to consider the merit (or peril)
of refashioning the contours of a subsidy central to modem American society.
I anticipate that many will challenge the wisdom of the particular refashioning of the
subsidy that this Article contemplates. Some may propose differentiation along
different lines, for example: subsidizing court use regarding disputes of certain subject
matter; subsidizing court use by "one-shot" players; subsidizing only cases tried to
verdict, and so on. 26 Others may focus on administrative, practical, or political
obstacles that will become more apparent as more accurate measurement of and
additional empirical research and/or theoretical refinement concerning the current
subsidy occurs. Still others may criticize the conceptual moorings of the evaluative
framework herein advanced. But those criticisms-whatever their ultimate merit-are
all part of a larger discussion long overdue.
125. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 54, 55-56
(discussing advantages and disadvantages of English system).
126. For example, Professor Marc Galanter famously argued over thirty years ago that
"repeat player" litigants bear considerable advantages against "one shot" litigants. See generally
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974). Although I have not explored the merits here, I can
envision an argument that certain "repeat players" should not be entitled to an appellate subsidy,
because they already have a heightened interest to undertake appeals.
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